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THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASESO
The new edition of Dean Green's case book is bound to be of un-
usual interest among teachers and students of Torts for the same
reasons that made the first edition the subject of wide-spread at-
tention. The general plan of arrangement in the revised edition
follows closely the analysis of the former work. The materials
themselves, of course, have been thoroughly re-edited and re-
arranged, and a considerable number of new cases included. The
total volume of material is somewhat less than the earlier edition.
The number of pages is not greatly reduced, however, by reason
of the larger type employed.
Aside from technical questions of scholarship, as to which no
question can be raised with respect to Dean Green's work, a case
book is a good one or a bad one in proportion to its effectiveness in
accomplishing the editor's purpose. Whether a critic approves of
a particular compilation of materials will therefore depend both
upon his approval of the editor's purpose and his judgment as to
the means employed. Dean Green has in his Foreword stated the
objectives of his course in Torts. These are, first the classification
objective, designed to afford an intellectual framework into which
torts cases can be fitted. This is primarily an analytical or a formal
objective. The second objective, as stated, is the attainment of "a
definite grasp of legal theory and its functions." The elaboration
of this objective indicates that it is primarily the instrumental or
functional side of tort law that is to be emphasized. These are the
two prime objectives. Incidental to these, the Dean desires his
students to obtain some notion of the wide range of human activities
that fall within that area of the law called "torts", to obtain some
grasp of the incredibly complicated character of the problems raised
by the most casual activity, and to obtain some historical perspective
of law as it has been developed into social patterns.
With all of the objectives emphasized by the editor, the reviewer
is in complete sympathy. The understanding of the doctrinal
aspects of the law of torts is the traditional function of the course.
Indeed, until recently, it may be said that it was probably the only
important purpose of the course. The arrangement of these ma-
terials, however, does not appeal to the reviewer as one calculated
easily to attain this result. Legal rules, principles, theories and
doctrine bob up throughout the pages in the most unexpected places.
Arranged as they are upon a type-fact pattern, one runs into a
principle of law at any place in the volume that it may happen to
be involved in the legal problem of the case. To be sure it is valu-
able and important for the student to understand how the principle
of contributory negligence is utilized by the courts in one type of
case as distinguished from another. It is important for him to
realize that the doctrine of proximate cause is one of great elasticity,
capable of certain adaptation in different types of cases. Intellectual
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sophistication requires that a student comprehend that the principle
of consent is like an accordion which can be extended to include
one type of case and contracted to exclude another. It is of the es-
sence of knowledge and wisdom that a student comes to realize how
courts utilize the vague principle of "intended" wrong in situations
involving emotional distress and mental anguish as distinguished
from tangible harm to person or property. Indeed, it is desirable
that he know the difference in uses of this doctrine between situa-
tions involving emotional disturbances to men on the one hand and
to women on the other. All this is highly important and necessary
to one who is to have any comprehension of the law of torts. It is
also necessary that the student obtain, and that he obtain quickly
and effectively, a thorough mastery of the purely formal aspects
of tort law. That law is, or should be, a rigorous discipline. Doc-
trinal lines must be drawn tight. Thinking must be straight. Any-
thing which tends toward a sloppy intellectual performance is un-
fortunate. The reviewer suspects that an attempt to introduce a
first year class into the realm of legal doctrine as it has been de-
veloped in tort law by sequences of cases built around factual
structures is not calculated to sharpen the students' legal wits.
It is not suggested that Dean Green's students finish up the year
with an inadequate knowledge of legal doctrines. The Dean is
known to be a masterful teacher, and his students will obtain ade-
quate direction in all aspedts of the course. It may be suspected,
however, that a knowledge of legal rules and theories is accomplished
in spite of the teaching vehicle rather than facilitated by it. There
is, of course, the other side of the argument. A case book built
upon doctrinal lines is not, perhaps, the most admirable tool with
which to indicate the real functions of tort rules. A good teacher
can bring this to his classes, however, more readily than he can re-
quire the intellectual drudgery involved in mastering subtle doc-
trine without the ideal arrangement of materials. The gist of the
argument against the functional arrangement in torts is that a
mastery of doctrine must logically precede a knowledge of its use.
How can a student understand the variations and shadings in the
application of a legal principle to varying fact-patterns unless he
has first commanded a thorough mastery of the principle in ques-
tion? The reviewer has often remarked that he would recommend
the use of Green's Cases on Torts for a graduate course in law or
jurisprudence. Whether it is equally useful as a tool for first year
students is highly doubtful.
Most of the material is devoted to physical harms to interests of
persons and property. About 175 pages are devoted to what the
Dean calls "harms of appropriation", a concept which has never
appealed to the reviewer as an altogether happy one when used
to include the problems of fraud and deceit. The objection to the
use of the notion of "appropriation" to such things as names,
history and personal services is not great. Indeed, it may be thought
to have distinct advantages. When it is stretched, however, to
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include the mine-run of cases in sales and credit transactions, its
helpfulness is questionable. On the other hand, the conception of"relational interests" which the Dean has exploited is a fortunate
one. Included therein are family relations, trade relations, pro-
fessional and political relations and general social relations. A
final, brief chapter is devoted to abuses of governmental power and
process, which includes malicious prosecution, false arrest, illegal
seizure and the like.
The Dean ran out of space when he got to "relational interests",
with the result that these phases of the law are given but brief, and
to the reviewer's mind, totally inadequate, treatment.
It is fortunate that all teachers of Torts do not agree upon
methods and tools. Certain it is that Dean Green's work in this
field has been most stimulating and provocative. More certain still,
the book and the method are not of great importance. The good





AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW*
Perhaps no development within the field of jurisprudence has
been more disturbing or is likely to have more significant effects
than that one now commonly, if somewhat ambiguously, referred to
as "sociological". It is not sociological in the sense that it was
initiated or promoted by a species of outsider known as "sociology".
In fact, it appears to have been of indigenous origin; it appears to
have arisen directly out of jurisprudence itself as scholars in that
field came under the same set of intellectual and other influences
that gave rise to sociology. The inventor of the term "sociology of
law", first used in a treatise published in 1892, was a student of
jurisprudence. The great names in the subsequent development of
the program, originally designated by the term, into a separate body
of scientific knowledge are generally those of jurists. In this coun-
try, for example, nearly all of the persons with whom even profes-
sional sociologists associate the movement are jurists, men of such
distinction as Pound, Holmes, and Cardozo. The movement is a
phase of the general shift to a scientific point of view and method
of research in all realms of inquiry.
It is not easy to define the movement. Like sociology in general
and like all radical developments in the intellectual realm, its vari-
able, tentative, exploratory expressions in its early stages were con-
fused and confusing, full of inconsistencies, and often more puzzling
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